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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT DALE STRALEY, : BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
Petitioner/Appellant, Case No. 20010052-CA 
vs. : 
UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS AND 
HANK GALETKA, 
Respondents/Appellees. 
NATURE OF APPEAL AND BASIS OF JURISDICTION 
Robert Straley appeals the trial court's order denying his request for extraordinary 
relief and dismissing his petition brought pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 65 B(b). This Court 
has jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78-2a-3(f)and (g) (2001). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly conclude that Straley's due process rights were 
met with regard to the Alienist's examination? 
2. Did the trial court correctly conclude that Straley was not entitled to either a 
limited confidentiality warning, or a Miranda warning prior to the alienist's 
interview? 
3. Did the trial court correctly conclude that Straley's vague and conclusory 
allegations regarding inaccuracies in the Utah Board of Pardon's (Board's) 
file were not supported? 
4. Did the trial court correctly conclude that Straley was provided the 
information that he was entitled to? 
5. Did the trial court correctly conclude that the Board has no obligation to 
advise Straley as to his right to contest the accuracy of the information, or to 
advise him as to his legal rights? 
6. Did the trial court correctly conclude that the Board does not violate the 
separation of powers clause? 
7. Did the trial court correctly conclude that Straley does not have a right to 
counsel at a parole grant hearing? 
8. Did the trial court correctly conclude that the Board's decision was properly 
made? 
9. Did the trial court correctly conclude that Straley failed to state a cause of 
action upon which relief could be granted against respondent Galetka? 
The standard of review for questions of constitutional law, State v. Martinez, 896 
P.2d 38, 39 (Utah App. 1995), like all conclusions of law, is correctness. State v. Riggs, 
1999 UT App 271,1f 7. 
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RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
Any relevant statutes or rules will be quoted in the text. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural history 
Straley originally filed a petition for extraordinary relief in the Utah Court of 
Appeals challenging various alleged constitutional violations involving an October 15, 
1998 Board hearing. (R. 5-11, 298). A Writ of Certiorari was denied by the Utah 
Supreme Court, and the petition was transferred to the Seventh District Court. (R. 303). 
On May 22, 2000, Straley's Motion to Amend the Petition was granted by the Seventh 
District Court. (R. 306). The Seventh District Court found that "Counts" I, VIII, IX, X 
and XII of Straley's amended petition were "frivolous on their face."1 (R. 303). The court 
served a copy of the amended petition on the Board, ordering the Board to respond to the 
remaining claims. (R. 304). The Seventh District Court subsequently granted the 
'Count I alleged that Utah Code § 77-18-4 is unconstitutional. (R. 299). Count 
VIII alleged Straley was not given credit for time served, thereby denying his equal 
protection rights, his rights against Double Jeopardy, and that "crediting one for time 
served is a core judicial function, and the board is an executive body." (F. 300). Count 
IX alleged that the Board violates the speedy trial clause by determining actual 
incarceration time. Id. Count X alleges Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme is 
unconstitutional, and Count XII alleges the statutes governing the board are 
unconstitutional as they deny the right to be heard. (R. 301). 
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Board's motion for a change of venue, transferring the amended petition to the Third 
District Court, and allowing the Board an extra 15 days to "answer or otherwise respond 
to those portions of the Amended Petition that were not summarily dismissed as being 
frivolous on their face." (R. 324-25). Accordingly, neither the Board nor the Third 
District Court addressed the claims found to be "frivolous."2 (R. 330, 491). The Board 
filed a response to the limited amended petition in the form of a Motion to Dismiss (R. 
327), which was granted with prejudice, as to the remaining "Counts:" II, III, IV, VI, VII, 
XI, XIII, XIV and XV. (R. 491). 
The Third District Court's Order indicates that after the Board's "Motion to 
Dismiss" was filed Straley filed a second "Motion to Amend." Id The Third District 
Court held that this second "Amended Petition" included the same claims contained in the 
first amended petition, including some dismissed by the Seventh Circuit. Id. The Third 
2Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(5) provides that the court must review the petition and if "any 
claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an 
order dismissing the claim...." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(6) goes on to provide that as to those 
petitions not dismissed as being frivolous on their face, that "the court shall direct the 
clerk of the court to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any memorandum upon the 
respondent by mail." The court also "may issue an order directing the respondent to 
answer or otherwise respond to the petition...." Pursuant to this rule, the Board was not 
ordered to respond to the "counts" dismissed by the Seventh District Court. 
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District Court dismissed as "frivolous on its face," the only new allegation, "Count" III.3 
Id. Straley's "Motion to Disqualify Judge Dever" was also denied. (R. 492). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly concluded that Straley's due process rights were met 
with regard to the Alienist's examination. Under both the federal constitution and 
Utah's parole statues, there is no liberty interest in being paroled. See Greenholtz v. 
Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, & (1979); Houtz 
v. DeLand, 718 F.Supp. 1497, 1502 (D. Utah 1989). Utah courts have held, however, 
under the Utah Constitution that due process protections apply in limited parole 
situations. Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 909 (Utah 1993). 
These limited situations include original parole grant hearings, or any parole hearing 
where an inmate's release date is fixed or extended. See Labrum, 870 P.2d at 909; Neel v. 
Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1994). Due process in these limited instances 
requires that an inmate know what information the Board will consider enough in 
advance to allow the inmate a reasonable opportunity to respond to and/or rebut any 
inaccuracies in that information. Labrum, 870 P.2d at 909. 
3Count III of the second amended petition alleged that the Board's certificate of 
service, indicating that the Board packet had been served on Straley, was inadequate. (R. 
385). 
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Accordingly, where the Board considered the Alienist report, that information 
must have been provided to Straley enough in advance for him to have had the 
opportunity to respond to and/or rebut such. No allegation is made that any one of these 
particularized due process requirements was not met here. The trial court correctly 
concluded that Straley received all of the due process protections he was entitled to. 
The trial court correctly concluded that Straley was not entitled to either a 
limited confidentiality warning, or to a Miranda warning prior to the alienist's 
interview. The Board ordered an Alienist's examination on Straley pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-27-7(3). This exam, conducted in the parole context, is neither criminal 
nor "sentencing" in nature. See Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons and Parole, 947 P.2d 664, 
668-70 (Utah 1997). Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that in this context 
the examination requires neither a Miranda warning nor a limited confidentiality warning. 
The trial court correctly concluded that Straley's vague and conclusory 
allegations regarding inaccuracies in the Board's file were not supported. The vast 
majority of Straley's allegations regarding inaccurate Board information are vague and 
conclusory. The only alleged inaccuracies pointed to with any particularity are Straley's 
dissatisfaction with the diagnosis of "pedophilia" in his alienist report, and the exact 
categorization of two of his prison disciplinaries. Straley alleges nothing proving that the 
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"pedophilia" diagnosis is false, and when the categorization error was brought to the 
Board's attention, it was rectified. Moreover, irrespective of categorization, at the time 
the Board made its decision Straley had two disciplinaries. 
The trial court correctly concluded that Straley was provided the information 
he was entitled to. Straley alleges that he did not have the opportunity to review his 
Presentence Investigation Report at the time of sentencing, and that he was allowed to 
"unconstitutionally waive his right to counsel" at Order to Show Cause hearings. Such 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65C allegations are not appropriate under this Utah R. Civ. P. 65B 
petition. 
Straley also claims he was not provided a "laundry list" of information to which he 
alleges he was entitled. The records do not support these allegations. The records show 
that either Straley was provided with the information, that the Board's file did not include 
the information, or that the information was included in Section 2 of the Board's file. 
Section 2 contains materials not ordinarily provided to inmates due to its classification 
under the Governmental Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA), or due to its 
nature as internal documentation. Any information in this section relied upon by the 
Board is provided to the inmate in a summarized form. 
The trial court correctly concluded that the Board has no obligation to advise 
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Straley as to his right to contest the accuracy of the information, or to advise him as 
to his legal rights. Straley provides no substantiation for his one sentence allegations 
regarding these issues. As this Court noted, it is "the inmate, therefore, rather than the 
Board, [who] bears the burden of reviewing the file and requesting more time upon 
discovering it lacks information the Board should consider." Peterson v. Utah Board of 
Pardons, 931 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah App. 1997). 
The trial court correctly concluded that the Board does not violate the 
separation of powers clause. Whether the Board's exercise of its parole power violates 
the separation of powers doctrine, was decided by the Utah Supreme Court in Padilla v. 
Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, 947 P.2d at 669. Padilla held that a court's power to 
sentence and the Board's power to pardon and parole "are two separate and distinct 
powers, neither of which invades the province of the other." Id. at 669. 
The trial court correctly concluded that Straley does not have a right to 
counsel at a parole grant hearing. The Utah Supreme Court decided this issue in 
Monson v. Carver, holding that the assistance of counsel is not required at parole grant 
hearings. 928 P.2d 1017, 1103 (Utah 1996). In this context, counsel is only necessary to 
protect due process rights afforded by article 1, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. Id. 
Straley alleges nothing indicating these due process rights were denied due to his lack of 
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counsel. 
The trial court correctly concluded that the Board's decision was properly 
made. The Board followed statutory requirements. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-
2(2)(f), Michael Sibbett, the Board's chair, conducted Straley's hearing. Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-27-5(c), a Board majority affirmed Mr. Sibbett's recommendation. 
Moreover, the rules of statutory construction resolve Straley's alleged 
"irreconcilable" statutory conflict. Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2(d) prohibits a Board 
member from holding any other office in state government, while Utah Code Ann. § 63-
25a-30, mandates that the chair of the Board must be a member of the Sentencing 
Commission. Of the two, however, Section 63-25a-301 is the subsequently enacted 
statute, which Utah law holds "generally supersede^] prior existing ones on the same 
subject," where, as here, the two statutes appear to present an "irreconcilable conflict." 
S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439, 443 (Utah 1998). 
The trial court correctly concluded that Straley failed to state a cause of 
action upon which relief could be granted against respondent Galetka. Straley 
alleges no cause of action against respondent Galetka, the Warden of the Utah State 
Prison at the time. Moreover, the only other named respondent, the Board, is in no way 
under Glaetka'a supervision. This case presents an analogous situation to that found in 
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Estes v. Van der Veur, where this Court dismissed an action against the Board, brought 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b), where the warden was the only named respondent, and he 
could not provide the relief petitioned for. 824 P.2d 1200, 1201 (Utah 1992), cert 
denied, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
STRALEY'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE MET WITH REGARD 
TO THE ALIENIST'S EXAMINATION. 
Straley is incarcerated for sexual abuse of a child. (R. 348). Utah Code Ann. § 
77-27-7(3) specifies that for this crime the Board must appoint one or more alienists to 
examine the offender within six months of his original parole date hearing. Accordingly, 
the Board ordered Straley's psychological evaluation, with the resulting alienist report 
being submitted to the Board. 
Straley argues that he was entitled to due process with regard to the administration 
of this exam, i.e., notice of the date, the time and the purpose of the examination. Straley 
bases this due process allegation on his assertion that he has a "liberty interest" in being 
paroled, and that since the alienist's report impacts the Board's decision regarding such, 
he has a due process right in the examination. Straley is mistaken. He has no "liberty 
interest" in being paroled. The United States Supreme Court in Greenholtz v. Inmates of 
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the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, held that the Constitution does not confer 
a liberty interest in parole. 442 U.S. at 7. Moreover, Utah's parole statutes do not 
provide a liberty interest under the federal constitution in being paroled. Houtz, 718 
F.Supp. at 1502. In fact, Utah parole statutes provide no "expectation of parole." Hatch 
v. DeLand, 790 P.2d 49, 52 (Utah App. 1990). 
Admittedly, Utah courts, have gone beyond federal mandates, holding that under 
the Utah Constitution, in certain limited situations, due process applies to parole hearings. 
Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d at 909. These situations are limited 
to original parole grant hearings, and parole hearings where "an inmate's release date is 
fixed or extended." Id.;Neel, 886 P.2d at 1100. Only in these instances, does due 
process require that an inmate know the information that the Board will consider, and that 
he know enough in advance to have a reasonable opportunity to respond and rebut any 
inaccuracies in that information. Labrum, 870 P.2d at 909. 
An alienist examination does not come under either of these limited situations. 
The only due process required with regard to this report, is that where the Board 
considered it in a parole hearing where a release date was fixed or extended, Straley must 
have been provided a copy enough in advance to have had a reasonable opportunity to 
prepare responses and/or rebuttal of inaccuracies. Labrum, 870 P.2d at 909. No 
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allegations are made that any one of these procedural safeguards was not met as to this 
report. The trial court correctly concluded that Straley received all of the due process he 
was entitled to in this context. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
STRALEY WAS NOT ENTITLED TO EITHER A LIMITED 
CONFIDENTIALITY WARNING, OR TO A MIRANDA WARNING 
PRIOR TO THE ALIENIST'S INTERVIEW. 
Straley confuses alienist reports ordered prior to sentencing with those ordered by 
the Board. Board-ordered alienist reports are to "specifically address the question of the 
offender's current mental condition and attitudes as they relate to any danger the offender 
may pose to children or others if the offender is released on parole." Utah Code Ann. § 
77-27-7(3). The alienist report in this parole context is for a noncriminal, nonsentencing 
function. The rights attached to such a report are not the same as those required in the 
criminal, sentencing context. 
Straley, nevertheless, relies exclusively on criminal cases requiring a Miranda 
warning prior to an alienist interview at the time prior to and/or at the time of sentencing. 
See Estellev. Smith 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680 (1989). Once 
again, however, parole is civil, not criminal in nature. Padilla, 947 P.2d at 670. 
Moreover, the Board does not sentence. While a few early Utah court decisions may 
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have contained language equating the Board's power to pardon and parole with 
sentencing, subsequent Utah decisions have unequivocally held that "[t]he power to 
execute sentences remains in the exclusive control of the judiciary," and that the court's 
power to sentence versus the 
Board's power to pardon and parole "are two separate and distinct powers, neither of 
which invades the province of the other." Padilla, 947 P.2d at 668-669. The trial court 
correctly concluded that with regard to the alienist report, neither a Miranda nor limited 
confidentiality warning is required in this noncriminal, nonsentencing parole context. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
STRALEY'S VAGUE AND CONCLUSORY ALLEGATIONS 
REGARDING INACCURACIES IN THE BOARD'S FILE WERE 
NOT SUPPORTED. 
Straley alleges the Board's file, and in particular his alienist report, contains 
inaccurate information. The majority of these allegations, however, are made in vague 
and conclusory terms, seemingly addressing Straley's disgruntlement with the report, 
rather than actual inaccuracies. The alleged inaccuracies pointed to with any particularity, 
are first, Straley's allegation that the alienist's diagnosis of "pedophilia" is "clinically 
impossible." See Straley's Brief, p. 14. This argument is somewhat incongruous 
considering Straley admits he had sex with a twelve-year-old girl. (R. 400). He further 
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argues that this diagnosis is being deleted from his Sex Offender Treatment plan at the 
Utah State Prison (Prison). See Straley's Brief, p. 14. 
First, on October 15, 1998, when the Board held its hearing, the Prison's purported 
decision to delete this diagnosis had not yet occurred. See Addendum A, "Prison 
Response"; (R.443). Second, even had this information appeared in the Board's file, a 
purported variance of opinion as to whether a "pedophilia" diagnosis is appropriate, does 
not prove the diagnosis is false. In such instances, the Board has the "right to rely on any 
factors known . . . or later adduced . . . , and the weight to be afforded such factors in 
deciding whether [a prospective probationer] pose(s) a societal r isk. . . ." Northern v. 
Barnes, 825 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah App. 1992), affd, 870 P.2d 914 (Utah 1993). 
Straley also alleges errors in his disciplinary reports. He filed a prison grievance 
regarding this error, and the Board's file contains a letter from the prison correcting such. 
See Addendum B, "Letters from the Prison" (R. 369- 71). The fact remains, however, 
that Straley had disciplinaries at the time the Board made its decision. Even though the 
categorization of such may not have been exact, two disciplinaries would still have been 
seen as aggravating factors by the Board. Moreover, the Board may have viewed 
Straley's actual disciplinaries, "possession of contraband" and "the unauthorized use of 
any vehicle, tool, device or object," as even more serious than the erroneous 
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categorization ones of "creating a health or safety hazard" and "failure to take medication 
as prescribed."4 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
STRALEY WAS PROVIDED THE INFORMATION HE WAS 
ENTITLED TO. 
Straley alleges he did not have the opportunity to review his Presentence 
Investigation Report at the time of sentencing, and that he was allowed to 
"unconstitutionally waive his right to counsel" at Order to Show Cause hearings. These 
allegations are not appropriate to a Utah R. Civ. P. 65B petition. They should be raised in 
a Utah R. Civ. P. 65C petition, dealing with "the legality of the conviction or sentence." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65C (c). 
Straley also alleges that he was not provided with Mr. Sibbett's notes, Adult 
Probation and Parole's (AP&P's) recommendation regarding his probation revocation, his 
4
 In Bukari v. Hutto, the Fourth Circuit held that to have a correctional file free 
from allegedly false and prejudicial information a due process right may be invoked only 
where the inmate alleges 1) certain information is in his file, 2) the information is false, 
and 3) it is relied on to a constitutionally significant degree. 487 F.Supp. 1162, 1167 (4th 
Cir. 1980). The third requirement is only met where two additional criteria are satisfied. 
Id. at 1168. The adverse administrative action must be within the "ambit of the due 
process clause," and the false information must be "significant and not merely technical 
in nature." Id. 
Using the 4th Circuit's analysis as to the "pedophilia" diagnosis, there is nothing 
alleged proving the diagnosis is, in fact, "false." As to disciplinaries, the third 
requirement is not met. The alleged inaccuracy is not significant in nature. 
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mental health and sex offender treatment reports, his inmate C-notes, his medical 
information, or his disciplinary information, including information surrounding his 
segregation. Addressing each of these in turn, first: the Board's file shows that Straley's 
disclosure packet contained a copy of AP&P's recommendation, as well as copies of 
information regarding his sex offender treatment.5 See, Affidavit of Sharel S. Reber; (R. 
379-81). Straley acknowledged receipt of his disclosure packet. See Addendum C, 
"Acknowledgment"; (R.373). Second, C-notes from the prison are not included in the 
Board's file, nor are quarterly mental health reports. See Affidavit of Sharel S. Reber; (R. 
379-81). 
Admittedly, portions of Straley's disciplinary information, as well as Mr. Sibbett's 
notes, were not provided him. The reason for this, is that this information is presently 
filed in Section 2 of the Board's file. See, Affidavit of Sharel S. Reber; (R. 379-81). This 
section ordinarily contains information not provided inmates due to its classification 
under the Governmental Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA), and internal 
documents not subject to disclosure under Labrum. If any information in this section is 
5The Board's file indicates what information has been provided to an inmate in his 
disclosure packet by placing a blue sheet on top of the provided information which states, 
"All Materials Below This Page Were Copied and A Disclosure Packet Prepared," with 
the initials of the preparer and the date prepared. See, Affidavit of Sharel S. Reber. 
(R. 379-81). 
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relied on by the Board it is provided to the inmate in a summarized form. As noted 
earlier, however, errors regarding the categorization of Straley's disciphnaries have been 
corrected. See Addendum B, "Letters from the Prison"; (R. 369-71). Moreover, as also 
previously addressed, this disciplinary error would have had little or no effect on the 
Board's decision since it was a classification error, not an error as to the number of 
disciphnaries. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
BOARD HAS NO OBLIGATION TO ADVISE STRALEY AS TO HIS 
RIGHT TO CONTEST THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION, 
NOR TO ADVISE HIM AS TO HIS LEGAL RIGHTS. 
Straley's allegations regarding this issue are mere one sentence assertions, with no 
substantiation. Moreover, as noted by this Court, it is "the inmate, therefore, rather than 
the Board, [who] bears the burden of reviewing the file and requesting more time upon 
discovering it lacks information the Board should consider." Peterson, 931 P.2d at 150. 
Likewise, here, once the Board provided the information to Straley, he bears the burden 
of bringing inaccuracies to the Board's attention. The Board also has no obligation to 
advise petitioner as to his legal rights regarding the pursuit of further legal action. 
Finally, none of the information that the Board's file indicated was provided to Straley, 
was provided in a summarized form. See Affidavit of Sharel S. Reber; (R. 379-81). 
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VI. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
BOARD DOES NOT VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
CLAUSE. 
Whether the Board's exercise of its parole power violates the separation of powers 
doctrine, was decided by the Utah Supreme Court in Padilla v. Utah Board of Pardons 
and Parole, 947 P.2d at 669. In that case, Padilla, an inmate at the Utah State Prison, 
sought extraordinary relief from the Board's actions in relation to his original parole grant 
hearing. As here, he alleged that the Board's power to pardon and parole amounted to a 
"sentencing" function, which is inherently judicial, and accordingly violated the 
separation of powers doctrine. Id. at 666. The court labeled this argument "flawed," 
stating that a court's power to sentence, and the Board's power to pardon and parole "are 
two separate and distinct powers, neither of which invades the province of the other." Id. 
at 669. 
While acknowledging under Utah's indeterminate sentencing that it is the Board 
that sets the actual number of years a defendant will serve, the court unequivocally held, 
"the Board's exercise of its parole power in setting determinate parole dates does not 
violate the separation of powers doctrine of article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution." 
Id. at 669. Padilla effectively disposes of Straley's allegations regarding this issue. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
18 
STRALEY DOES NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT A 
PAROLE GRANT HEARING. 
The issue of whether an inmate is constitutionally entitled to counsel at parol grant 
hearings was addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d at 
1103. The court held that the assistance of counsel is not required at these hearings, 
since parole proceedings are not "criminal proceedings" to which the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel attaches. Id. The Utah Supreme Court noted in Neel v. Holden, that the 
right to counsel in a parole grant hearing would be necessary only where it "proceeded] 
out of the due process rights afforded by article I, section 7 of the Utah constitution." 886 
P.2d at 1103. Straley's only alleged justification for counsel is that an alienist report is 
"extremely complex." (R. 400). Such reasoning would necessitate counsel any time an 
alienist report is ordered. Due process does not require such. 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
BOARD'S DECISION WAS PROPERLY MADE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2(2)(f) states, 
[a]ny investigation, inquiry, or hearing that the board has authority 
to undertake or hold may be conducted by any board member of an 
examiner appointed by the board. When any of these actions are 
approved and confirmed by the board and filed in its office, they are 
considered to be the action of the board and have the same effect as if 
originally made by the board. 
19 
Pursuant to this statute, Straley's hearing was held before Michael A. Sibbett, the 
Board's chair. Further, in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(c), which 
mandates that where, as here, an action is taken by other than a majority of the Board that 
decision must be affirmed by a Board majority, a Board majority affirmed Mr. Sibbett's 
recommendation. See Addendum D, "Hearing Worksheet6"; (R. 375). 
Moreover, Straley misreads the Board's decision sheet. It states that it is the final 
decision "of the hearing held on 10/15/1998." See Addendum E, "Decision Sheet"; 
(R.377). It does not state that the final decision was made on 10/15/1998. Id. The 
Board's rational signed by Mr. Sibbett, was signed either after the day, or on the day that 
other Board members signed their final decision. See Addendum D, "Hearing 
Worksheet"; (R. 375). 
Straley also argues that Mr. Sibbett, as chairman of the Board cannot be a member 
of the Sentencing Committee. The basis for this argument is Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-
2(d) which states, "[a] member of the board may not hold any other office in the 
government of the United States, this state or any other state, or of any county 
government or municipal corporation within a state. A member may not engage in any 
6Four members of the Board initialed the worksheet, constituting a majority of the 
Board. See Addendum D, "Hearing Worksheet"; (R. 375). (Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-27-2(1), the Board consists of five full-time members). 
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occupation or business inconsistent with his duties." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-25a-301(f), on the other hand, mandates that one of the 
members of the Sentencing Commission shall be "the chair of the Board of Pardons and 
Parole or a designee appointed by the chair." This apparent conflict is resolved by the 
rules of statutory construction. The Utah Supreme Court states that, "subsequently 
enacted statutes generally supersede prior existing ones on the same subject," where there 
is "an irreconcilable conflict between the two. S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d at 443. These two 
statutes appear to present an "irreconcilable conflict." As such, the statute enacted first 
supersedes the prior existing statute. 
Here, Utah Code Ann. § 63-25a-301, dealing with the composition of the 
Sentencing Commission, was enacted in 1993. Enacted 1993 Utah Laws ch. 77, § 1. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2, mandating that no board member hold office in the 
government, was enacted in 1985. Enacted 1985, Utah Laws ch. 198, § 7. Therefore, the 
Sentencing Commission statute, Utah Code Ann. § 63-25a-301, supercedes Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-27-2, thereby allowing the chair of the Board to serve on the commission. 
This statutory construction meets what appears to be policy concerns behind Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-27-2, i.e., the legislative desire to avoid any Board member having 
partisan governmental connections, thereby assuring a totally nonpartisan body. 
21 
Membership on the Sentencing Commission, however, in no way jeopardizes a Board 
member's nonpartisan standing. As stated in Utah Code Ann. § 63-25a-304, the purpose 
of the commission is, 
to develop guidelines and propose recommendations to the Legislature, 
the governor, and the Judicial council about the sentencing and release 
of juvenile and adult offenders in order to: 
(1) respond to public comment; 
(2) relate sentencing practices and correctional resources; 
(3) increase equity in criminal sentencing; 
(4) better define responsibility in criminal sentencing; and 
(5) enhance the discretion of sentencing judges while preserving the 
role of the Board of Pardons and Parole and the Youth Parole 
Authority. 
Nothing in Commission's stated purpose would jeopardize the nonpartisan nature of the 
Board.7 
IX. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
STRALEY FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UPON 
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED AGAINST RESPONDENT 
GALETKA. 
The Commission also includes "two trial judges and an appellate judge" as well as 
"two juvenile court judges," Utah Code Ann. § 63-25a-301(h)--(i), whose qualification 
for office includes resigning "from any elective, non-judicial public office or political 
party office which they may hold." Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 3-102(l)(A). The 
inclusion of the judiciary on the Commission speaks to the nonpartisan nature of that 
body. 
22 
Straley names Hank Galetka, the Warden of the Utah State Prison at the time, as a 
respondent. Straley, however, fails to allege any actions Galetka took in this matter to 
harm him, or to violate any of his recognized legal rights. Moreover, Straley's other 
named respondent, the Board, is in no way under Galetka's supervision. 
This Court dealt with an analogous situation in Estes v. Van der Veur, where a 
prisoner brought an action under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b), claiming that he was imprisoned 
illegally due to a denial of due process by the Board of Pardons. 824 P.2d 1200 (Utah 
App. 1992), cert denied, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992). The only named respondent, 
however, was the prison warden. This court affirmed the grant of the motion to dismiss, 
explaining that the petitioner had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted, since the warden could not provide the relief petitioned for. Id. at 1201. 
Here, Galetka is also without authority to grant the relief Straley seeks. 
Consequently, the trial court correctly concluded that Straley fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted as to respondent Galetka.8 
8As noted earlier, the trial court dismissed as frivolous several of Straley's 
"counts," which the Board was not ordered to respond to. The instant appeal is limited to 
the trial court's order finding that those "counts" were "frivolous on their face." Straley 
not only makes no showing that the trial court's determination of frivolousness is not 
correct, he totally fails to address it. The trial court's "frivolous" determination as to 
those counts is appealable, not the merits of the allegations. "It is well established that 
this court will decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief." 
23 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's order dismissing Straley' petition for extraordinary relief should 
be affirmed. Because this case deals with claims addressed by established law, the Board 
does not request oral argument or a published opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 
o4^ 
J September 2001. 
MARK A. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
SHAREL S. REBEI 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On l*[ September 2001,1 mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, two copies of 
this BRIEF OF APPELLEE to: 
Robert D. Straley 
Inmate # 24725 
State v. Vigil, 922 P.2d 15,28 (Utah App. 1996). 
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LEVEL I GRIEVANCE 
STAFF RESPONSE 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
GRIEVANCE NUMBER: 9908- 33- 342 
INMATE NAME: Robert Straley 
INMATE NUMBER: #24725 
On December 15, 19991 met with your Sex Offender Treatment therapist and the clinical 
Supervising Psychologist for the program. It was decided in that meeting, that the diagnosis of 
pedophilia would be deleted from your current sex offender treatment plan. I will review your 
treatment file and delete that diagnosis from your plan. Your S.O.T.P. therapist will be sending 
you a written document which will identify the change. 
-0729W2 
(Original to inmate/ copy to level 1 grievance file) 
ADDENDUM B 
"Letters from the Prison" 
ifSSk I State of Utat 
V:>^ V*v 




DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
EXECUTIVE OFFICE 
6100 South Fashion Place Boulevard 
Murray, Utah 84107 
(801)265-5512 
FAX (801) 265-5726 
- Suite 400 
MEMORANDUM 
To: John Green 
Administrative Coordinator 
From: R. Spencer Robinson \ ' 
ALJ ° " 
Re: Inmate Robert Straley 
USP #24725 
Grievance Appeal #99D-05-30877 
Date: August 23, 1999 
Attached is a copy of my letter to Inmate Straley regarding grievance 99D-05-30877. The 
information sent to me indicates inaccurate information was communicated to you regarding his 
disciplinary case 9704281. You may wish to review what was submitted to the Board for accuracy, and 
to include my letter in your records. 
cc: Inmate Straley's file 
Michael O. Leavitt 
Governor 
H.L. H a u n 
Executive Director 
c;f-,o o f I ITCJ n 
•C> v>. i » - t ^ i 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
EXECUTIVE OFFICE 
6100 South Fashion Place Boulevard • 
Murray. Utah 84107 
(801)265-5512 
FAX (801) 265-5726 
Suite 400 
August 23,1999 
Inmate Robert D. Straley 
USP #24725 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
Re: Grievance #99D-05-30877 
Inmate Straley: 
On August 23, 1999 I reviewed the above-noted grievance appeal. This matter deals with you 
alleging case worker Douglas Mecham forged an erroneous write-up in report #9704281 (failure to take 
medication to counter my claim of a shy bladder). You claim Mecham swore you had this write-up in 
your jacket. You state there is no such write-up. You request that Information systems find this case; 
when it is determined the case does not exist, the Douglas Mecham be reprimanded; and that the Board 
be notified that false information was forwarded to them. There is no additional administrative review. 
If you remain unsatisfied, you must seek a judicial remedy. 
The information sent to me with your grievance shows the charges in #9704281 which resulted 
in a finding of guilty were B-3-N (Possession of Contraband), as opposed to B-3-E (Creating a Health or 
Safety Hazard), and B-2-0 (The Unauthorized Use of any Vehicle, Tool, Device or Object), as opposed 
to B-2-Q (Failure to Take Medication as Prescribed). 
You may use GRAMA to request an amendment of records to correct errors. I have sent a copy 
of this letter to the Board of Pardons and Parole. I have suggested my letter be included in the Board's 
file on you. 
V\. ^^JUA^^W^^^-
R. Spencer Robinson 
Administrative Law Judge 
Utah Department of Corrections 




({Jut) st^M, Iflil MnS 
Name f^~~ y€pWj& USP ff 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RATIONALE FOR DECISION ON \0/lj/fv FOR 
Heating Date Hearing Type 
le Board of Pardons1 decision is based on the following factors: 
iGRAVATING MITIGATING 
OFFENDER'S BACKGROUND 
Criminal history significantly underrepresented by guidelines 
(i.e., more than k felony convictions and/or 8 misdemeanors) 
History of similar offenses 
^ 
Pattern of increasingly or decreasingly serious offenses 
History of unsuccessful or successful supervisions . . 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE 
Use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities 
Demonstration of extreme cruelty pr depravity f- Abuse of position of trust, special skill, or responsibility 
y^ Multiple incidents and/or victims 
Personal gain reaped from the offense 
OFFENDER'S TRAITS DURING THE OFFENSE 
7^ Motive (intentional, premeditated vs. impulsive, reactionary) . 
y^ Role (organizerx leader v&. follower, minimal participant) . . _____ 
Obstruction of justice vs. early withdrawal or self-surrender . 
VICTIM CHARACTERISTICS 
Extent of injury (physical? emotional, financial, social) 
>^ > Relatively vulnerable victim vs. aggressive or provoking victim 
Victim in position of authority over offender 
OFFENDER'S PRESENT CHARACTERISTICS ^ 
Denial or minimization vg. complete acceptance of responsibility ><-Repeated, numerous v&. first incarceration or parole revocation 
Extent or remorse and apparent motivation to rehabilitate . . . 
Timeliness and extent or efforts to pay restitution 
Prison programming (effort to enroll, nature of prog, 
^ Prison disciplinary problems or other defiance or authority . . 
Employment possibilities (history, skills, current job, future) 
rogramming) . ^< 
. _ _ . _ . _ . ) 
Extent of community fear, condemnation 
Degree of meaningful support system 
Nature and stability of release plans 
Unusual institutional vulnerability (due to age, health, other) 
Overall rehabilitative progress and promise 
Lengthy history of alconol/drug abuse vs.. apparent rehabilitation. 
Substantial continuous period in custody on other charges • . • _ 
Likely release to detainer 
OTHER 





Inmateft 24725 Inmate: Robert D. Straley 
Parole disclosure file. 
I hereby acknowledge receipt of my Board of Pardons and 
Dated and signed this {j? day of October, 1998. 
I witnessed that the above-named inmate accepted the Board of 
Pardons and Parole disclosure file. 
Dated and signed this 1998 
tions' Employee 
I refuse to accept my Board of Pardons and Parole 
disclosure file 
Dated and signed this day of October, 1998 
Inmate's Signature USP # Time 
I witnessed that the above-named inmate refused to accept 
the Board of Pardons and Parole disclosure file. 
Dated and signed this day of October, 1998. 
Correct ions• Employee 
Note: If you need assistance, please contact your caseworker. 
ADDENDUM D 
"Hearing Worksheet" 
08/98 09:53 AM 
:iS: 00071528 
Hearing Worksheet 
NAME: STRALEY, ROBERT DALE 
KLR Page: '1 
USP: 24725 
REHEARING 
:iS 00071528 NAME STRALEY, ROBERT DALE 
tING DATE: 10/15/1998 OATH 
LING OFFICIAL: Enid Pino 
USP 24725 
months 60 Staff Rec 0 months USP Rec Hi? it >fc,cc 
sion: 




















BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE OBSCIS NO. 71528 
Consideration of the Status of STRALEY, ROBERT DALE PRISON NO- 24725 
The above-entitled matter came on for consideration before the Utah State Board 
of Pardons on the 20th day of October, 1998, for: 
REHEARING 
After a review of the submitted information and good cause appearing, the Board 
makes the following decision and order: 
RESULTS 
Rehearing set for 01/2001 with an 
Alienist Report due prior to the hearing. 
Final decision of the hearing held on 
10/15/1998. 
No Crime _ _ Sent Case No. 
1 " SEXUAL "ABUSE OF A "CHILD 1-15 931700103 







This decision is subject to review and modification by the Board of Pardons at 
any time until actual release from custody. 
By order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this date 
20th day of October, 1998, affixed my signature as Chairman for and 
on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons. 
M. R. Sibbett, Chairman 
AFFIDAVIT 
of Sharel S. Reber 
SHAREL S. REBER (#7966) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (#1231) 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
P.O. Box 140857 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Telephone: (801)366-0353 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT DALE STRALEY, AFFIDAVIT OF SHAREL- S. REBER 
Petitioner, : 
vs. : 
UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS, and Case No. 000905776 
HANK GALETKA, 
: Judge Leslie Lewis 
Respondents. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Sharel S. Reber, under oath state the following to be true and correct to the best of my 
knowledge. 
1. I am a resident of the Untied States of America and the State of Utah, and I am 
over the age of eighteen (18) years. 
2. I am an Assistant Attorney General employed with the Utah Attorney General's 
Office, and represent the respondents in this case. I have personal knowledge of 
the facts stated in this affidavit. 
3. I have reviewed petitioner's entire Board of Pardon's (Board) file in preparing 
respondent's Motion to Dismiss, and accompanying memorandum. 
4. The Board's file indicates what information has been provided to an inmate in his 
disclosure packet by placing a blue sheet on top of the provided information 
which states, "All Materials Below This Page Were Copied and a Disclosure 
Packet Prepared." The initials of the preparer and the date the materials were 
prepared are also indicated on the blue sheet. 
5. Accordingly, the Board's file indicates that petitioner's disclosure packet 
contained a copy of Adult Probation and Parole's recommendation. The blue 
sheet is initialed by "RC" on September 30, 1998. 
6. Petitioner had a hearing before the Board on October 15, 1998. 
7. C-notes from the prison are not included in the Board's file, nor are quarterly 
mental health reports. 
8. As it appears in the Board's file, no medical information is attached to petitioner's 
Board application. 
9. Portions of petitioner's disciplinary information are presently filed in Section 2 of 
2 
r\ i \ r\ r> c\ 
the Board's file, which ordinarily contains information not provided inmates due 
to its classification under the Governmental Records Access and Management Act 
(GRAMA). 
DATED this J _ day of August 2000. 
i-\ojl) i 
SHAREL S. REBER 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to me this 7 ^ day of August 2000. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
AMY CASTERUNE 
160 East 300 South, 5th Fir. 
Salt Uk t City, Utah $4111 
My Commission Expirat 
April 26,2004 
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My Commission Expires: 
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